



RESEARCH PAPER

Analysis of Social Impacts of Terrorism and Military Operations in Pakistan in Swat

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DOI [http://doi.org/10.47205/plhr.2019\(3-1\)02.2](http://doi.org/10.47205/plhr.2019(3-1)02.2)

PAPER INFO	ABSTRACT
Received: January 17, 2019	Terrorism is a major problem in Pakistan since the destructive attacks of 9/11. The people of Malakand division in general at Swat in particular blindly followed Mullahs before the insurgent and military operations. The merger of Swat with Pakistan in 1999 changed the administrative as well as judicial system. The researcher followed a mixed method to analyze the impact of terrorism at military operation in Pakistan in Swat. Firstly, Mullah Saif Muhammad and his Organization TNSM exploited the situation by raising the slogan for the imposition of Islamic Laws to provide speedy justice to people. Secondly, Mullah Fazlullah and TTP Swat faction full advantage of the circumstances and left no stone unturned to play with the peace of the region. The researcher recommended that the government struggle must be for security, prosperity, tolerance and to free the public from any kind of danger, militancy, extremism, and terrorism.
Accepted: June 15, 2019	
Online: June 30, 2019	
Keywords: Islamic Law, Social Impact, Military Operations Swat, Terrorism, TNSM,	
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Introduction

Pakistan faced many problems after its independence, which disturbed the political, social, and economic life of the country. With time state tried to recover the gaps and provided good governance to his citizens. However before the recovery from the existing problem after some decades another problem arose in the form of terrorism, insurgency, and extremism. Those insurgent acts were a serious threat to the internal and external and security of Pakistan. That also affects the social, political, and economic situation of the state and society (Daraz, 2008). Before 9/11 or 2001 there was no such dangerous situation in FATA and KP

while after 9/11 the situation became worse in Pakistan, especially in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (Jones & Fair, 2010). The same was the situation in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) of KP (former NWFP) like Swat and Dir in 1994. That situation was created by a local religious cleric Sufi Muhammad, head of *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM) and his slogan was "Implementation of *Shariah*" (Islamic Law) in Malakand division KP (Aziz, 2010). However, that situation was not as bad as experienced after 9/11. The event of 9/11 changed the politics of the world. No country was spared from its bad effects. Being a neighbor of Afghanistan Pakistan became the frontline state in war against terrorism. The Taliban government refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the US, who was alleged to have supported the attackers of 9/11. After 9/11 the US pressurized Pakistan to launch military operations in FATA and KP. In 2007-08 several operations were conducted by Pak-Army in Malakand division KP. Since 2001 the operations conducted by the Pak army in FATA (Fair & Jones, Pakistan's within war) affected the socio-political and economic life of the people in the region (Khattak, 2010).

The incident of 9/11 was a paradigm shift in world politics. On September 11, 2001, two jet planes hit the twin tower in the United States of America (USA). The US official authorities said that Al-Qaeda did it and that offensive attack took thousands of lives. The US government asked Taliban government to hand over Osama bin Laden to the US authorities but Taliban replied in negative and as a result the US and NATO forces attacked Afghanistan (Gupta, 2006). The incident also changes the internal and external policies of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The US tried to compel the government of Afghanistan to hand over the mastermind of the 9/11 attack and their leader Osama bin Laden but the Taliban government refused the US demands. Therefore the US pressurized the government of Pakistan to give them Military bases and assistance against the Afghan Taliban. The government of Pakistan agreed to play the role of Frontline ally of the US in the war on terror. Pakistan also puts its sovereignty at stake (Rehman, 2011) to allow the US and NATO forces to conduct airstrikes or drone attacks in FATA to hunt their suspects.

The decades old Afghan war and the decision of the policy makers of Pakistan to support US against USSR brought the war to the borders of Pakistan. Training centers for fighters were established with the help of CIA. When Soviet Union was left Afghanistan, those fighters did not go to their homelands but preferred to live in FATA. Pakistan deployed her army on the Afghan border and launched military operations in FATA to eliminate the settled and suspect militants from FATA. The attempts were both military and political nature. The purpose was to clear the area from terrorists and foreign fighters and to contribute to the war on terror. It brought the war straight to Pakistan and the fighters started reaction (Chughtai, 2013). The Pakistan army tried to avoid collateral damages, but it may be emphasized that in military operations there were large numbers of innocent civilian casualties and internal displacement of people (IDP) happened, but the top leadership of the Taliban was unable to be

arrested and failed to stop their activities and objectives (Irshad, 2011). The reactionary people and groups took arms against the Pakistan army and security forces and formed various militant groups and organizations. These non-state armed groups took action against Pak and Afghan governments and US-allied forces as well. In these groups, *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) in FATA and TNSM in Malakand division (KPK) are the most prominent groups (Ahmad, 2013).

The terrorism had social, economic, and political causes (Fair, 2011; Mullins, 2016) with the same socio, economic, and political impact on the state and society in Pakistan, FATA, and KP. One of the big causes of terrorism was the military operation in FATA and KP. The Pakistan government decided to conduct military operations against these terrorist and militant groups to eliminate terrorism. It was natural for Taliban and other fighters to attack the security forces of Pakistan because once they fought for their national interest in Afghanistan against the Soviet forces. It was a decision that Pakistan took without liking it because the US was ready to attack Pakistan in case of negative response from it (Haq and Zahra, 2009). Because of these military operations, the innocent people were more affected in FATA and KP. Socially the education, health, and moral values of the people of FATA and KP were also affected while their economic conditions businesses and infrastructure were much damaged (Farzana Bari). The terrorism and military operations resulted in more than 5 million Internally Displace Peoples (IDPs) to the different camps in Pakistan KP. These all losses left a permanent and strong impact on the people's minds.

Merger of Swat in Pakistan

Swat was merged with Pakistan in 1969. The merger had both positive and negative impacts. The areas of Swat state was given the status of district and Deputy Commissioner was put in charge. Decisions were made and executed locally during the rule of *Walisuib*. There was no corruption or bureaucratic inconvenience. According to *Walisuib* "there was neither an opening ceremony nor I laid the foundation stone but that was my duty and I did it" (Barth, 2011). The developmental works in swat were very rapid. The first Deputy Commissioner of Swat Sayed Munir Hussain said that the developmental works in Swat were more than enough and no more developmental works were needed. Instead, the running works should have continued (Sultan-i-Room, 2011). The merger of Swat and the beginning of new administration slowed down the process of development till 1980 but since 1980, some works in the fields of education and health. The communication system was extended to most parts of Swat but the quality and standard were not good and its conditions became worst with each passing day. *Walisuib* narrated the post-merger conditions of Swat as there was one mind and one person in coordination with administration. The policies were long term and persistent. The post-merger situation was very bad. Officers came and went without learning anything (Sultan-i-Room, 1999). The people of Swat were very confused to see the new

system of government. The new administration failed to redress the grievances of people. In Swat State, the courts were very rapid. In one or two hearings the cases were decided. Even death cases were decided in days. But the new judiciary had many complications. Prolongation, corruption, confusion, unfairness, etc. became common. The order of the Supreme Court in 1992 worsened the situation further when PATA was declared null and ultra vires. Mullah Sufi Muhammad raised voice for the implementation of Islamic Laws and he took full advantage of the situation (Bangash, 2012).

Tehrik-e-Nefaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM)

Mullah Sufi Muhammad started his activities in 1990. He visited many villages and addressed huge gatherings. His main slogans were the imposition of Islamic Laws and speedy justice. In the beginning, he failed to attract people but the order of the Supreme Court to declare PATA null and ultra vires paved the way for him. He exploited the situation very well because he was a very good orator. He established *Tehrik-e-Nefaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM). With time TNSM became stronger and extended its activities to other parts of KPK and FATA (Ali, 2010). It was very interesting to note that Mullah Sufi Muhammad belonged to Dir district but he was interested to implement Sharia in Swat. He established Swat as the center of his activities. He established his movement in Swat (Roggio, 2009). The movement got popularity in 1994 when the activists of the movement started the *black turban* movement. They forced the government to bow to their demands and the governor signed the *Nezam e Sharia Regulation Act*. It failed to satisfy TNSM and the movement continued its activities (Sayed, 2015). Till 2001, TNSM showed its presence to the government on different occasions. The event of 9/11 changed the whole scenario.

The 9/11 Attack and Formation of TTP Swat

The event of 9/11 brought another destruction to Pakistan. As soon as the US and NATO forces attacked Afghanistan, Mullah Sufi Muhammad took about 10000 people to Afghanistan for war. Most of those people were untrained and were either killed or captured but somehow Mullah Sufi Muhammad escaped from the scene and came back to Pakistan. Mullah Sufi Muhammad was captured and sent to jail in his absence his son in law Mullah Fazlullah became the supreme leader of TNSM (Rahee, 2011). TTP was officially established in 2007. Baitullah Mehsud was the first *Amir*. Hafiz Gul Bahadur was appointed as the secretary of Baitullah Mehsud. Mullah Fazlullah was declared as the first leader of the TTP Swat faction (Siddique, 2010). Swat valley became the center of terrorism in 2009. The government of Pakistan bowed to terrorists and signed a peace deal with them. As a result, Swat was ceded to the Taliban which provided a golden opportunity to the Taliban to reorganize and extend their rule to other districts also (Rahman, 2011). A video of a teenage girl beaten by Taliban angered not only Pakistanis but also the peace-loving people of other countries of the world. The government of Pakistan decided military operation and a full-scale operation was

conducted (Fleischner, 2011). The operation was very difficult but succeeded. Thousands of people were displaced who migrated to other parts of the country. After about a year the displaced people returned to their homes (Masood, 2009). Pakistan has played a huge price for alliance in the global war against terrorism. The low economic growth, brutal killings of people, and infrastructure are the worst effects of terrorism in Pakistan. Tourism suffered and the lives of people directly affected. The economy of Pakistan suffered a huge loss of billions of dollars (Khan, 2013). The economy of Pakistan in general and KPK in particular has received a big blow due to the attacks of terrorists. The economy of Pakistan has been destructed to an alarming level. The World Bank has lowered the credit rating of Pakistan (Khan, 2009).

Literature Review

Barath says that Swat was merged with Pakistan in 1969. Before the merger Swat was a stable State and famous for good administration and speedy justice. The impacts of merger were not as wished by the people of Swat. The number of bad impacts was greater than good. Swat was given the status of district and a deputy commissioner was installed to run the affairs of the district. The problems of the people started with the introduction of the complicated bureaucratic system of Pakistan. The local people had no experience of that system. Before the merger the decision making system of Swat State was very simple as most of the powers were enjoyed and exercised by the king. It was a very speedy system. There was a very small file work and very big tasks took only few days for solution. The words of Wali Swat can be quoted here "there was no foundation ceremony, no foundation stone, no propaganda for me but as a king did all as it was my duty" (Barath, 1986).

Professor Sultan e Room is a well-known professor of History in Swat. He has written many books on Swat State. He has quoted the word of the Deputy Commissioner of Swat Sultan Hussain Shah, who said that when Swat was merged in Pakistan, it was a very well developed area. As compared to Pakistan the quantity of developmental works were more. There was no need to start more developmental projects but the already started projects needed to be completed. It showed that there were enough projects started by Swat State (Room, 1999).

Salman Bangash, Head of the Department History, University of Peshawar has many articles about Swat. According to him Swat was a part of Malakand division and PATA was the law of Pakistan for Malakand division. TanzeemNefaz e Shariat e Muhammadi (TNSM), a religious movement for the imposition of Islamic laws at Malakand division was started by the local Mullahs led by Maulana Sufi Muhammad. The movement tried to get advantage from the decision of Supreme Court in which it was decided that Malakand division would be ruled by the normal laws of Pakistan. TNSM asked the people of Swat to raise

voice for the imposition of Islamic laws. The activities of TNSM increased which led to insurgency in Swat (Bangash, 2012).

Ali and Roggio conducted research work about terrorism in Swat. Maulana Sufi Muhammad belonged to a small town of Dir district of Malakand division, KPK Pakistan. He was a member of religious cum political party Jamaat e Islami and was elected as member in the local election two times. In 1989 he left JI and started a movement Tanzeem Nefaz e Shariat e Muhammadi for the imposition of his own version of Islam. In the beginning it was a peaceful movement but with the passage of time it was changed to militant movement as there hundreds of fighters who has a better experience of fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan. The government wa reluctant to take strict action but was compelled to crush the movement with iron hand due to the terrorist activities of TNSM (Ali, 2010), Roggio, 2009).

Well known journalist Shaheen Buneri in his article explained terrorism in Swat. When Sufi Muhammad came back from Afghanistan he was arrested along with his members. His son in law Mullah Fazlullah took over the charge of the organization TNSM. Very soon he started teaching the holy Quran in his seminary situated near Mingora city. He introduced FM channel. He became very famous due to his concentration on the rights of women in property and some other reasons. In no time he became famous throughout Swat. His disciples extended his mission to other parts of Malaknd and Hazara division. In the beginning it was TNSM but was changed to TTP Swat after drone attack in Bajawa rseminary. The movement was changed to militant movement and took control of 90% areas of Swat. The government launched military operation to defeat TTP Swat (Buneri, 2015).

Hashim in his article said that when Taliban organized their first target was schools. Similarly barber shops, shrines of saints, properties of opponents, security forces and attacks on peace loving people became the order of the day. Suicide attacks on opponents and security forces were ordered by Mullah Fazlullah. A special force was introduced for killing, slaughtering and suicide bombings named Shaheen controlled by Serajuddin. That captured schools, hospitals and government buildings along with the vehicles of public. Black turbans were seen in every corner of Swat. Most of the areas of Swat and some other adjacent districts were controlled by TTP. The then MMA government was not ready to take a full-fledged military operation due to political gains. But the PPP led government ordered operation and large scale military operation was conducted (Hashim, 2012).

Shaukat analyzed the causes of defeat of Taliban. There were many causes of the defeat of Taliban. The strong determination of the armed forces of Pakistan, local support and inhuman behavior of Taliban contributed to their defeat in Swat. Pakistan army encircled Taliban from all sides and Pakistan air force bombed their hideouts. In street fight the soldiers of army did not care for their

lives but inflicted a heavy defeat on Taliban. They taught Taliban how to fight. The local people provided all kinds of information to the armed forces about the movement and hideouts of Taliban (Shaukat, 2015).

Bhatti, a Ph.D. researcher found that the life of the local people was badly suffered due to Taliban and military operations. The standard of living of common people decreased. Thousands of people died and injured. Even the properties of local people were not spared by Taliban and the remaining task was completed by military operations. Tourism was a big source of income for the people but it was 100% stopped. Similarly agriculture and education badly suffered. The local customs were declared un-Islamic by Taliban. People of all walks of life suffered (Bhatti, 2015).

Aziz in his research paper said revealed that the activities of Taliban and military operations had direct effect on the lives of people of very walks of life. Majority of people migrated from Swat and suffered unbearable hardships. Those who remained in Swat were restricted to their homes for more than three months (Aziz, 2010).

Elahi contributed a paper about the impacts of terrorism in Swat. According to him the social norms of the people were also affected during the wave of terrorism. Hujra (a place for hospitality), Jirga (a meeting for the solution of problems) and other elements of Pakhtoonwali (a code of conduct for Pakhtoons) were not spared. Ethnic bonds, mutual trust and brotherhood of people was targeted by Taliban. The displacement of people had not only financial but also very serious cultural impacts. Some people made relationships with the people of the areas where they took shelter during the operations. Some people experience insults while financial loss was common to all (Elahi, 2015).

Khan conducted a research about the social impacts of terrorism in Swat and other areas of Pakistan. According to him more than 383000 people were displaced from Swat. They rushed to the safe areas of Pakistan. Military operation was conducted against the terrorists in which terrorists were defeated. Most of them were either killed or injured. The rest fled the area. The social impacts of the operation were very alarming and destructive (Khan, 2013).

Pakistan deployed her army on the Afghan border and launched military operations in FATA to eliminate the settled and suspect militants from FATA. The attempts were both military and political nature. The purpose was to clear the area from terrorists and foreign fighters and to contribute to the war on terror.

Hypothesis

- i. Insurgency and military operations have decreased religious extremism
- ii. People do not follow Mullahs blindly.
- iii. People are not satisfied with the role of Mullahs during the insurgency.
- iv. Criminal minded people supported TTP.
- v. The crises developed a sense of unity in people.
- vi. Participation of people in ceremonies has decreased due to fear of terrorist attack
- vii. People have doubts about the security situation.
- viii. Speedy justice can reduce the support of the Taliban.

Material and Methods

This is a qualitative as well as quantitative research. The data was gathered through various sources has been analyzed critically. There are two kinds of data i.e. primary and secondary utilized in the research. A questionnaire was formed for primary information about the social impacts of terrorism. The traders, shopkeepers, teachers, students, social workers, lawyers, and farmers were included in the respondents.. The researcher tried to get equal respondents in females too but the hardly 15% female expressed their views about the social impacts of terrorism in Swat. Most of the female belonged to education department and health department. The secondary data was gained from net and books were analyzed. The articles, papers and books of the eminent writers were preferred.

Sampling

The method of simple random sampling was adopted. 300 people were randomly selected from different areas of Upper Swat. According to the nature of the questionnaire, every respondent was required to tick mark the answer according to his mind. Social impacts of terrorism were the main topic of the questionnaire. Every respondent had the option to choose correct answer from the given three options. In some areas the researcher faced problems as majority of people were not ready or reluctant to answer the questions. The reason was that people had doubts about the researcher as Taliban and security forces had secret agents in the area.

Data Analysis

The collected data was put and coded in SPSS to test the hypothesis. Moreover, Pearson Chi-square was used to determine the statistical result.

Table 1
Hypothesis

Insurgency and military operations have decreased religious extremism				
Yes	No	I Don't Know	Pearson Chi Sq. Value	Significance Level
203 (68%)	91 (30%)	06 (2%)	1.222E2 _a	.000

Table 1 reveals that the majority of 68% of respondents supported the statement and 30% of people responded negatively while 6% of people did not answer. Terrorism and military operations had strong impact upon the hearts and minds of people. When Sufi Muhammad started his movement TNSM, the people of Swat were easily attracted and deceived on the name of the imposition of Islamic laws. TNSM created soft corner in the hearts and minds of people which was fully exploited by Mullah Fazlullah. In no time he was successful to make the local population extremists. In those days the only answer of the people about the possible solution of the problem was the TTP version of Islam. But military operation taught very great lesson to the people of Swat and their minds were turned from extremism. In this way extremism decreased to a great extent.

The Pearson χ^2 value $000 < 0.05$. Hence the null hypothesis H_0 is rejected. It can be said that a decrease in religious extremism is not by chance but it is closely associated with military operations and terrorism. The emotions of extremism have been washed away from the minds of the majority of people by terrorism and military operations.

Table 2

Hypothesis				
People do not follow Mullahs blindly after terrorism and operations				
Yes	No	I Don't Know	Pearson Chi Sq. Value	Significance Level
205 (68%)	72 (24%)	23 (8%)	1.222E2 _a	.000

Table 2 shows that 68% of respondents agreed, 24% disagreed while 23% preferred silence. Before the wave of terrorism and the subsequent military operations all kinds of Mullahs were openly allowed to preach what they like. Before the merger there was complete ban on all kinds of extremism and those found involved in extremism were expatriated from Swat. When Swat was merged in Pakistan all kinds of extremist rushed to Swat and found it a very suitable place for their activities. A good quantity of blind followers was trained by those Mullahs. When TNSM and then TTP started activities it was very easy for them to find disciples for blind following. Even very highly educated people were attracted by them very easily. The destruction on the hands of TTP and then military operations left strong impact on the minds of people and if not all, majority of people stopped following Mullahs blindly. In most of the mosques such Mullahs were removed from leadership. The table supports it as majority of respondents opted for the first answer.

The Pearson χ^2 value $000 < 0.05$ is highly significant. The null hypothesis H_0 is rejected. The variables are closely associated. Military operations and terrorism have left a great impact on the minds of people. Before the insurgency majority of people blindly followed Mullahs but now people do not follow Mullahs blindly.

Table 3

Hypothesis				
People are not satisfied with the role of Mullahs during the insurgency.				
Yes	No	I Don't Know	Pearson Chi Sq. Value	Significance Level
87 (29%)	190 (63%)	23 (8%)	1.116E2 _a	.000

Table 3 shows that 29% of respondents are satisfied with the role of Mullahs during terrorism, 63% of respondents do not agree while 23% remained silent. Before the terrorism most of the people had good corner for Mullahs and were not ready to hear a single word about them. The role of Mullahs in social life was very big. When circumstances became worse in Swat the local people expected good role from Mullahs but they were much dishearten when instead of solving the problem most of the Mullahs provided support to Taliban. The reason was that they either had the same Deobandi school of thought or were afraid of Taliban and those Mullahs (Barelvies and some old Deobandies) who opposed TTP were executed publicly. But the role of Mullahs during the crises changed the minds of people and most of the people were found not satisfied from their roles. Most of the Mullahs had the opportunity to play their due role for peace because some of the top leaders of Taliban were their disciples.

The Pearson χ^2 value $000 < 0.05$ is highly significant. The null hypothesis H_0 is rejected. At the beginning of terrorism, most of the blind followers of Mullahs believed that Mullahs would play a positive role in the restoration of peace but they were depressed to know that most of the Mullahs supported the Taliban openly or secretly. Mostly, Mullahs supported the Taliban due to fear of death because the Taliban had killed their opponents. Some Mullahs supported the Taliban because of ideological association.

Table 4

Hypothesis				
Criminal minded people supported TTP.				
Yes	No	I Don't Know	Pearson Chi Sq. Value	Significance Level
195 (65%)	75 (25%)	30 (10%)	1.471E2 _a	.000

Table 4 shows that 65% of respondents agreed, 25% of respondents disagreed while 10% remained silent. Like other areas of Pakistan, criminal minded people were also present in swat. Such kinds of people earn their

livelihood by criminal means. These include professional killers, drug sellers, Timber Mafia etc. they made contacts with Taliban and agreed to pay amount to the rate fixed by Taliban. The professional killers who had already good experience of killing people became Taliban militants. It also became one of the causes of the worst reputation of Taliban. TTP became a safe haven for all kinds of criminal minded people of Swat and other areas. They easily adjusted themselves in TTP. Most of them were killed or captured by security forces during the operation. Only the name of the crime changed. The respondents also opted for the first answer. In the beginning most of the people regarded Taliban as honest and good people but when criminal minded people joined them their reputation was decreased to a great extent and in that way Taliban lost legitimacy. The common people were not ready to hear a word about Taliban but the company of criminal minded people compelled the common people to change their thinking about Taliban.

The Pearson χ^2 value $000 < 0.05$ is highly significant. The null hypothesis H_0 is rejected. No one was ready to accept that criminally minded people were the active supporters of the Taliban but the rule of the Taliban made it clear that criminal minded people adjusted in Taliban militants for the sake of their interests.

Table 5

Hypothesis				
The crises developed a sense of unity in people.				
Yes	No	I Don't Know	Pearson Chi Sq. Value	Significance Level
151 (50%)	118 (39%)	31 (11%)	1.894E2 _a	.000

Table 4 shows that 50% of respondents agreed, 39% disagreed while 11% remained silent. The Pearson χ^2 value $000 < 0.05$ is highly significant. The null hypothesis H_0 is rejected. There was no unity among the people of Swat before terrorism. Terrorism brought massive destruction which compelled the people to unite to some extent. This unity is not by chance but strongly associated with terrorism and military operations.

Table 6

Hypothesis				
Participation of people in ceremonies has decreased due to fear of terrorist attack				
Yes	No	I Don't Know	Pearson Chi Sq. Value	Significance Level
191 (64%)	73 (24%)	36 (12%)	1.076E2 _a	.000

Table 4 shows that 64% of respondents agreed, 24% disagreed while 12% remained silent. Participation of people in social gatherings is a part of our

culture. In birth, death and marriage ceremonies people participate with great enthusiasm. If one does not participate, the host became angry with him. Most of the Swat is a rural area and the people rural areas warmly participate in such ceremonies. During terrorism suicide bombers blew themselves in such gatherings and people frightened. A single blast in a funeral ceremony at Mingora inflicted a very heavy casualty to the people and more than two hundred people were killed. Now the participation of people in such gathering is nominal and people show reluctance while participating. The answer of people about such participation shows that they are not ready to participate in social gatherings.

The Pearson χ^2 value $0.000 < 0.05$ is highly significant. The null hypothesis H_0 is rejected. The people of Swat had some beautiful customs of marriages and funerals. The threat and fear of terrorist attacks limited their participation in ceremonies.

Table 7

Hypothesis				
People have doubts about the security situation.				
Yes	No	I Don't Know	Pearson Chi Sq. Value	Significance Level
112 (38%)	123 (40%)	65 (22%)	1.090E2a	.000

Table 7 shows that 38% of respondents agreed with the statement, 40% disagreed while 22% remained silent. Although most of the areas of Swat and adjacent areas is clear after military operations but people still afraid. Security forces can be seen everywhere but there are doubts in the minds of people that Taliban can come in changed dress and plant bombs. The answer of the question is different in different areas. The people of Matta and Kabal Tehsils are still afraid while the people of other areas are clear about security situation except little doubts.

The Pearson χ^2 value $0.000 < 0.05$ is highly significant. The null hypothesis H_0 is rejected. Although the terrorists have been defeated but terrorists attack members of Peace Committees which create doubts in the minds of people.

Table 8

Hypothesis				
Speedy justice can reduce the support of the Taliban.				
Yes	No	I Don't Know	Pearson Chi Sq. Value	Significance Level
155 (52%)	76 (25%)	69 (23%)	1.990E2a	.000

Table 8 shows that 52% of respondents agreed with the statement, 25% disagreed while 23% remained silent. Speedy justice was one of the most important salient features of Swat state. It was available to all the citizens at very cheap and affordable rates. By this point TNSM and TTP deceived the common people. When Swat was merged with Pakistan, people were happy as they expected speedy justice but became very dishearten when Pakistan failed to solve their

disputes even in decade. In the table 52% of the respondents favored the assumption that speedy justice can solve the problem of Swat forever.

The Pearson χ^2 value $000 < 0.05$ is highly significant. The null hypothesis H_0 is rejected. Before military operations the people of Swat believed that if the demand of the Taliban for the imposition of Sharia was accepted then peace would be restored but when the government bowed to the demands of the Taliban and promulgated Sharia the situation worsened further. Taliban organized them in that time and extended their activities to other areas of KPK. The people came to know that there was a big difference between the speedy justice of Swat State and the Taliban version of Islam. The opinion of the respondents shows that speedy justice like that of Swat State can decrease the public support of the Taliban and bring permanent peace and stability in the region.

Conclusion

The military operation is not the permanent solution of terrorism but it was the last option to handle the situation in Swat. The Taliban regime of Fazlullah was defeated but despite the defeat of the Taliban, the military operation had adverse effects also. Many people were killed. Property, worth billions of rupees was destroyed. Tens of thousands of people migrated from Swat to other districts of Pakistan. The social, political, economic, and all aspects of the lives of common people were suffered. The research shows that the behavior of people towards Mullahs has changed. Mullahs had special roles in every walk of life. The people of Swat were mostly religious minded and they gave too much respect to Mullahs but the role of Mullahs was not good. It affected the minds of people and the people of Swat no more blindly follow Mullahs. The majority of people are not satisfied with the role of Mullahs in the war against terrorism. Before the military operation, most people regarded Sharia as the permanent solution of Swat crises but after the military operation, no one is ready to accept the Taliban version of Sharia and regard speedy justice as the permanent solution to the problem. The people have understood the difference between the Taliban version of speedy justice and the speedy justice as provided by Swat State. In some areas of Swat, a sense of unity has developed which is a good sign for the peace of the area but the fear of terrorism still lives in the hearts of people and most of them are reluctant to participate in ceremonies and gatherings. In most areas, religious extremism has decreased to a great extent and the common people no more tolerate extremist Mullahs in their mosques. Terrorism and military operation have changed the behavior of common people who once blindly followed Mullahs.

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